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Introduction
The disarmament and development debate is a curious
phenomenon. It began formally within the United
Nations machinery in 1960. A resolution of the
General Assembly asked the Secretary General to
examine the economic and social consequences of
disarmament. It requested an examination of the
effects at a national level, within different economic
systems and in countries at differing levels of
development, including the likely effects upon
demand, world trade and the possible structural
imbalances which would be caused within and
between nations following disarmament. In other
words, it represented a form of planning for
disarmament; it was a policy-related document. The
purpose was to facilitate 'the utilisation of resources
released by disarmament for the purpose of economic
and social development, in particular of the under-
developed countries." This was based upon a common
sense equation; the enormous amount of the world's
resources which are spent upon armaments are a waste
and would be better spent on development efforts.
This, in essence, has remained the motive for
establishing an institutional link between disarmament
and development efforts within the UN. It has been to
ensure that the 'disarmament dividend' - the
resources released by the disarmament process - is
directed towards social and economic development,
particularly in the Third World. This same intention
can be seen in almost all other reports on the subject.
The most recent UN report, chaired by Inga Thorsson,
echoes the same sentiments [UN 19821.2 It has
developed a far more sophisticated analysis of the
ways in which disarmament might be achieved and
considers a range of ways in which resources might be
transferred, but it presents essentially the same thesis.
See Resolution 1516 (Xv), adopted by the UN General Assembly
15th December. 1960.
2 See pages 4-6 for a review of previous UN consideralions of the
subject.
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It is important to establish the background to this
concept, because it helps us to understand why the
debate has remained marginal to both development
thinking and to the conduct of disarmament and arms
control negotiations. It would be wrong to imply that
those involved in the debate are under any illusions
about this matter. Thorsson states, in a revealing
passage, that: 'at a time when progress on
disarmament and development issues is minimal and
seemingly beset by major differences in viewpoint,
conflicting interests and lack of political impetus,
proposals for a new disarmament fund for develop-
ment, which would link the two issues, seems
audacious . . .' [UN 1982: 135]. Previous studies have
gone further and argued that there is some danger in
establishing an institutional link between the two
subjects lest slow progress in one area should delay
progress in the other.3
It is also noticeable that none of the reports on
disarmament and development has considered in
detail the structural links between the two issues. The
implication has always been that it is fhe scale of
military expenditure which is at issue. Furthermore,
the level of expenditure by the superpowers and their
direct allies has always been such a large proportion of
the world total, that it has almost been taken for
granted that the dividend from disarmament would
come from the transfer of resources from North to
South. Thus the debate has not come to grips with the
crucial links between patterns of defence expenditure
and levels of underdevelopment. Nor has it explored
how military expenditure and militarisation in the
South might reinforce technological and economic
dependence. Because of this, the debate has failed to
capture the central attention of development theorists
that it deserves.
Within the UN the link served an important purpose
by adding a strong moral imperative to the
disarmament process. But the generalised nature of
This point was made explicitly in United Nations 1972.
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the debate has meant that it has achieved few, if any,
concrete gains in two and a half decades. Much of the
explanation for this must lie with the underlying
limitations of the UN system. Recognising this, we
want to suggest that there are nevertheless important
ways in which the debate can be pushed along more
productive lines. In this article, we put forward some
of the issues which have remained implicit in the
debate in order to encourage a more direct approach
to the underlying problems.
What Lay Behind Establishing the Link?
Before attempting this it is worth dwelling, for a
moment, on the purpose behind establishing the
disarmament-development link. Within the UN, the
broad nature of the debate would seem to have
performed a specific function - almost a hidden
agenda. This relates to the move by the world's most
powerful states away from a declared policy of
disarmament to one of arms control and limitation
during the 1960s. The concept of a disarmament
dividend was closely associated with attempts within
the UN to keep alive the ultimate goal of General and
Complete Disarmament (GCD). To many in the field
of international relations, GCD is at best a diversion
[see Gray 1978]. Within the UN machinery, however,
it remains a powerful symbol. This relates to the UN's
intended function as the broker of a common security
system. During the days of the League of Nations the
aim of General and Complete Disarmament was a
fundamental tenet. The UN has placed rather less
emphasis upon it, focussing instead upon the need to
establish a measure of common security which does
not fundamentally alter the system through which that
security is guaranteed. Nevertheless it implies that, at
some future date, it will be possible to maintain the
security of nations without resort to either the need for
arms or war. Only then can the vast resources
presently assigned to armaments be assigned to
economic and social development.
In the event, neither GCD nor common security has
played a central role in the power relations between
nations. This became most evident in the 1960s when
the United States and the Soviet Union chose to
undertake their most basic and promising negotiations
on a bilateral or trilateral4 basis. Furthermore, the
underlying assumptions about what these negotiations
were intended to achieve also shifted. Arms control
was conceived by the Americans as part of the new
doctrine of flexible response. It became part of the
battery of ways in which it was thought security - and
in particular the security interests of the superpowers
might best be advanced. Arms control was intended
to address the more destabilising effects of armament
As in the case of the Partial Test Ban Treaty negotiations, where
Britain acted as an intermediary.
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developments and thereby ensure strategic stability
and the status quo. Thus the SALT I Treaty was a
bilateral treaty, signed without reference to other
nations or to the UN. It dealt strictly with restrictions
upon anti-ballistic missile systems and with ceilings on
the numbers of launchers in the central strategic
arsenals of the superpowers.
Over time, arms control became an institution of the
arms race and disarmament became a marginal
consideration. One response, therefore, was for critics
of this process to attempt to keep the issue of
disarmament alive within the UN, with GCD as an
eventual goal. An important way of achieving this was
to improve the UN's disarmament-related machinery.
The most clear example of this was the slow but sure
progress towards the establishment of the Dis-
armament Affairs Division, a shift which came out of
the first UN Special Session on disarmament
(UNSSOD I) in 1978. Previously the head of the UN
Centre for Disarmament was responsible in the first
instance to the Under-Secretary of the Political and
Security Affairs Division - a Soviet post. Now the
head of the Disarmament Affairs Division, a Swede,
has Under-Secretary status and reports directly to the
Secretary General.5
Actively linking disarmament with development was a
part of this 'hidden agenda'. It provided a symbol of
exactly what was at stake in the demand for
disarmament. It became all the more significant when
the growing contingent of non-aligned Third World
states forged links with the neutral countries of
Europe within the UN. These links have been
particularly noticeable at the Conference on Dis-
armament in Geneva, where they act in concert as the
Group of 21 Neutral and Non-aligned Countries. It is
this coalition which lies behind the attempt to shift'the
focus of world politics away from an exclusive
reference to East-West relations to one that
concentrates upon redressing the imbalance between
North and South. Seen in this light, Disarmament for
Development is a powerful metaphor in the struggle to
alter perceptions which have, over time,
institutionalised the 'realpolitic' approach to global
problems.
Why a Change of Emphasis Now?
lt has been two and a half decades since the initial
intervention of the 'disarmament for development'
lobby. Halfway through the Second Disarmament
Decade and the Third Development Decade, it is
evident that a more constructive approach is needed,
and one which recognises the close links between
armament and current levels of underdevelopment
For details of the UN's disarmament related machinery see ADIU
1984a.
and maldevelopment. The basis of this approach
would be a recognition that current defence policies
and practices are failing to provide political and
economic security.
Three trends in particular demonstrate the vulnerability
of states in the South and the underlying dilemmas of
both armament and disarmament. First, there is an
increasing preparation, on the part of both East and
West, for intervention in the Third World. This
directly challenges both the security and the sovereignty
of countries in the South. For the United States, direct
intervention has become a plausible political option
once more. The establishment of the Rapid
Deployment Force (RDF) has been described as a
state of mind; it demonstrates a renewed willingness to
intervene, particularly in the affairs of Southwest Asia
and the Middle East. It is now subsumed under the US
Central Command (USCENTCOM) founded in 1983.
This was the first new geographic unified command to
be formed for 35 years. It has forward based
headquarters afloat in the Persian Gulf, and
emphasises the ability to rapidly project all its forces to
an area of conflict in the region, drawing upon forces
normally assigned to the US Readiness Command [US
Department of Defense 1985: 231ff]. However, the
United States is also acquiring new tools and
revitalising old ones to make interventïon in any part
of the world a reality.
The formation of USCENTCOM is just one aspect of
the renewed readiness on the part of the United States
to project its military power around the world. It is
also an element in a major nuclear and conventional
rearmament programme. One particularly striking
example of this trend is the deployment of Tomahawk
cruise missiles. By 1995, the United States Navy plans
to deploy 3,994 Tomahawks at sea. There will be a
range of surface and submarine platforms - from
revitalised World War II battleships such as the New
Jersey, which will form the core of Surface Action
Groups, to hunter-killer submarines of the 637 and
688 classes. Each will have a mixed arsenal of anti-ship
(conventional), land attack nuclear and land attack
conventional cruise missiles. The greatest attention so
far has been focused upon the nuclear deployments
and their potential use against countries in the South,
but by far the greatest number of Tomahawks, some
2,643, will have a conventional land attack capability.
Of these 1,486 will be single warhead while the rest will
have a dispenser warhead for anti-airfield operations
[US Government Printing Office 1984: 361-2].
The implications of this are clear: the Tomahawk
deployments on US ships are intended for intervention
in the affairs of other nations by their use or
threatened use in political disputes as they arise
around the world. A Surface Action Group has
already seen action in the Lebanon. It is not far fetched
to imagine the use of Tomahawks in place of shelling if
the target or the political gesture warranted it. With
Tomahawk anti-airfield missiles the capability would
exist to destroy a country's entire airforce on the
ground at a crucial moment in any dispute. This is only
one aspect of a trend towards the use of military
intervention instead of diplomacy.
Furthermore, there is a dangerous trend towards
blurring the distinction between nuclear and con-
ventional forces - witness the dual-capability of
much of the RDF, ranging from systems such as the
M-198 towed 155mm artillery to a wing of B-52H
bombers known as the Strategic Projection Force. The
blurring of the distinction is intentional and is part of
the 'single entity' concept of deterrence in which forces
ranging from the central strategic forces to the
contingency forces of the RDF are seen as a
continuum. It is unlikely that the United States would
consider using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear
nation directly, but security is seen to rest in part on an
ambivalent message; deterrence value is seen to be
enhanced by that ambiguity. The implication of this is
that all disputes around the world where American
interests are seen to be at stake can be interpreted and
deterred using the East-West axis as a yardstick. It is
just this sort of threat which the late Indira Gandhi
used to justify India's enormous military expansion in
the early l980s. Furthermore, it constitutes what
might be referred to as the widening of the nuclear
threshold by the existing nuclear states. It is this trend,
rather than the likelihood of more states acquiring a
nuclear weapon option, which is causing the greatest
instability to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Meanwhile, relations between the superpowers have
reached their lowest point since the early 1960s. The
desire of the United States and the Soviet Union to
avoid direct confrontation in their increasingly
overlapping spheres of influence, coupled with
improved crisis management, should not belie the fact
that the present military build-up on both sides is
making existing conflicts more destructive and
increasing the risk of a major escalation between the
superpowers.
A second trend relates to the nature of military
technology. This has an important bearing on efforts
by states in both North and South to 'buy' security,
but its impact is greatest in the South. Available
evidence from studies of American weaponry suggest
that weapons systems are increasingly over complex,
unreliable and difficult to maintain during combat
[Spinney 1980; Rasor 1983]. It would seem that
European and Soviet weapons acquisition practices
are following suit. Through the arms trade,
technology transfer, and a fixed perception of what
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constitutes effective technology for defence, the South
is rapidly absorbing the costs, problems and dubious
improvements in defensive capability inherent in
modern defence postures.
Nor has this transfer been of particular benefit to the
process of industrialisation in Third World countries,
with little in the way of spin-off or even the
establishment of a viable indigenous defence industrial
base. Military technology has perhaps the fastest rate
of obsolescence and represents the widest technology
gap between developed and developing nations. The
arms trade has increased the level of technological
dependence of the South upon the North. The supply
of spare parts has proved to be both a major element in
the value of arms contracts and a means of
establishing a long-term link between supplier and
consumer. This has the added effect that withdrawal
of supply represents an important political lever,
witness the impact of past arms embargoes in the
Middle East and the Indian sub-continent.
The cost of armament has also been a major element in
the level of indebtedness. It has been estimated that
arms imports represent approximately 25 per cent of
the accumulated debt in the Third World {Brzoska
1983: 275; Kitchenman 1983]. This indirectly limits the
economic choices of developing countries and
enhances the role of international institutions such as
the World Bank and the IMF in defining the economic
strategies of the indebted nations.
The third trend has already been alluded to, but
deserves some further comment. It is the failure of
efforts to achieve arms control and the virtual non-
existence of disarmament. Having blocked progress in
nuclear arms control at the multilateral forum of the
Conference on Disarmament (CD),6 the bilateral
nuclear arms control process between the United
States and the Soviet Union has itself reached a nadir.
Both the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations
broke down in 1983. The resumption of negotiations
in the form of the so-called 'Umbrella Talks' in
Geneva seem unlikely to make progress. The Soviet
Union is insisting that the Strategic Defence Initiative
(SDI) must be halted before progress can be made on
offensive weaponry, while the United States is
insisting that the SDI is not negotiable and will form a
new basis for security.
This stalemate is more fundamental than many would
like to admit. The breakdown of INF and START
The only conceivable area where a disarmament agreement might
be reached at the Conference on Disarmament, is tn its efforts to
conclude a chemical arms control agreement. Even titis is
overshadowed by major chemical réarmament programmes by both
the United States and the Soviet Union and the use of chemical
agents in the Iran-iraq war.
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marked the lowest ebb in superpower relations for two
decades. Much of the rhetoric from the Reagan
Administration must be put down to the need to
justify its massive rearmament programme, but
nevertheless it marked a distinct break in the tradition
of arms control which had been built up over 25 years.
The resumption of talks owes much to the desire on
both sides to improve relations, but to be seen to be
talking is the extent of this effort so far. At the same
time, the policy of bargaining from a position of
strength has effectively converted the arms control
process into a means of legitimating new weapons
programmes. (It was Henry Kissinger who once satd
'What in the name of God is strategic superiority .
What do you do with it?' He answered his own
question by proceeding to bargain with it!)
Furthermore the SDI has effectively put nuclear arms
control back to where it was before the start of the
SALT ¡ process in the late 1960s. The understanding
which was embodied in the SALT I agreement about
the relative value of offensive versus defensive systems
is lost and with it the basis of mutually assured
destruction. It seems unlikely that the next decade or
so will see the re-establishment of such a common
understanding.
Nor would progress in existing arms control
negotiations necessarily represent a particular benefit
for countries in the South. Agreement to limit the
deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles in
Europe, for example, would do nothing to halt the
deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles, either
nuclear or conventional. lt is also likely that the Soviet
Union would retain a number of SS-20s targeted upon
China.
On the other hand the arms control and disarmament
process is no longer an entirely reserved area. On one
level, this is reflected in the rapid growth of a
transnational peace and disarmament movement.
While this has seemingly failed to prevent any
deployments of new weapons, it has had the effect of
bringing defence policy and decision-making far more
into the public arena. To an unprecedented extent this
has allowed the emergence of a critique of current
defence thinking, including small but increasingly
vocal pockets of criticism from within the defence
community itself.
On another level, far more countries are now involved
in the machinery of disarmament, witness the increase
in membership of the CD and its precursors from 10
countries, with a strictly East-West divide, in 1960, to
40 countries, with a strong neutral and non-aligned
contingent. It is noticeable, however, that the United
States and the Soviet Union shied away from the CD
as the main forum for their negotiations on nuclear
weapons once non-aligned nations joined the forum
[ADIU 1984b]. The UN General Assembly itself has
become a far more vocal critic of the lack of progress
in halting the build-up of armaments. However, it
remains the case that the two Special Sessions Devoted
to Disarmament, held in 1978 and 1982, achieved little
beyond a form of words condemning the arms race,
with little prospect of reversing, let alone halting,
current trends.
What Next for the Disarmament and
Development Debate?
It is to mechanisms by which current trends can
possibly be halted, if not reversed, that we now wish to
address ourselves. The three trends outlined above are
closely interrelated. It is clear that there is little
prospect of achieving major disarmament measures in
the present climate and with our current level of
understanding of the dynamics of the armament
process. Political will alone cannot halt the arms race
if the institutions which sustain it are not addressed
and changed at the same time.
Nevertheless, it seems as if some of the contradictions
now developing in the armament process may open up
significant opportunities for change. These are
opportunities which can be taken advantage of by
individual countries willing to re-examine their own
defence and military procurement policies and how
these relate to security and development. In non-
military areas of science and industrial policy an
increasing stress is being placed upon 'appropriate
technology'. Yet, to date, there have been few
corresponding critiques of defence, despite its central
and crucial role in both science and technology.
Military expenditure is not only a burden on the
economy, but also inefficient in achieving its stated
objectives. But politically, it is a reserved area. To
some extent this is because of the central role of the
military in the machinery of the state, and not only in
those Third World countries where it plays a direct
political role. Because there has been so little debate
about possible alternatives, security still tends to be
defined in terms of the accumulation of armaments.
Therefore any reduction of levels of armament, which
disarmament inevitably implies, is seen as detrimental
to security.
Nevertheless, once states can begin to move beyond
what might be called the 'military balance mind-set' it
becomes possible to consider alternatives. Central to
such a reassessment must be a re-evaluation of the
concept of security itself. To a large extent, this has
become uncoupled from the concept of political and
indeed economic security (a crime Clausewitz would
not forgive). Thus, to an extent that many
governments in the Third World, and indeed Europe,
would be loath to admit, independent political action
has been curtailed by technological and financial
dependence. Moreover, national security contains the
same contradiction as national development: it has
failed the majority for whom it should be intended.
More fundamental changes, however, will only come
when states perceive themselves to be more secure
within their regional setting.
This argument should not obscure the many
complications and pitfalls. Nor should it be taken as a
case against the use of high technology for defence as
such. Rather, what is needed is a recognition that
modern weapons systems should be regarded as
having reached, as it were, the end of their product
cycle. Further investment will continue to yield fewer
and fewer useful gains in terms of increased security;
indeed it may even reduce security. Given these
endemic problems, the issue of how much spending
upon arms is enough will have to be confronted sooner
rather than later.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to generalise about what
constitutes effective security. 'Threat perceptions' and
'defence postures', in the language of strategic
analysis, are specific to individual states and regions.
Different countries have varying abilities to assimilate,
let alone purchase or produce, any given level of
military technology. Furthermore, there are many
states in the Third World, for example in Southern
Africa, Central America and the Carribean, which
have to cope with genuine threats to their survival.
Hence, unless alternative structures and processes can
be developed to meet perceived security needs, the
concept of disarmament will remain a side issue for
countries in the South. Certainly, in this regard, the
UN has not so far proved capable of guaranteeing the
common security which its charter promises.
There are a number of regional and bilateral initiatives
which could provide a starting point for a departure
from the existing impasse. Non-aggression pacts,
treaties of cooperation and friendship, and nuclear-
free zones, although often cosmetic, can play a role in
confidence-building at a regional level. Certainly
regional cooperation would reduce the extent to which
the superpowers can intervene and escalate localised
disagreements into extensions of the East-West divide.
In the final analysis, however, security - both in the
narrower sense of the ability to pay for defence and the
broader sense of reduced conflict - will be the
product of more successful development. This of
course brings us full circle, but it is an important point
to make, nonetheless. This is why change demands a
much better understanding of the relationship
between armament and underdevelopment; a clear
recognition that it is not simply a question of resources
being better spent upon development than upon the
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military sector. Much as 'peoples' development' has
come to represent an attempt to meet the basic needs
of the bulk of a nation's population, the similar
concept of 'peoples' security' may help to return the
concept closer to the root of the word.
Conclusion
This article has tried to map out ways in which some of
the aims which motivated the disarmament and
development lobby might be achieved. Here we are
clearly still working at a conceptual level, and there are
no illusions about the difficulties that will be
encountered in moving to the operational. Part of the
problem is that, at present, those who talk of
disarmament and those who speak of security are
talking different languages. It is all too easy for
governments to dismiss the idea of disarmament as
irrelevant; to argue that defence is a necessary evil.
Defence, it is said, isan essential prerequisite behind
which - basking in the security it provides -
development can proceed. It is possible to demonstrate
that the reverse is true. Current defence policies - and
behind them arms production and arms transfers -
have actually diminished sovereignty because they
underpin both technological and economic
dependence.
We have called for a change of direction; for a
recognition that there is real scope for choice and
change in how security is defined and achieved, both in
the industrial North and the developing South. In
doing so we hope to help reverse the present
polarisation in the debate between the advocates of
disarmament and the proponents of security.
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